

**EUROPSKA SIGURNOST: VIZIJA, INSTITUCIONALNA
HISTORIJA I OPERATIVNOST**

**EUROPEAN SECURITY: A VISION, INSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
AND OPERABILITY**

Pregledni naučni rad

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Sažetak:

Europska sigurnosna strategija je izgrađena tako da se uklapa u postojeće strukture, a ukoliko je Schengen primarna jedinica mjere koja se proteže izvan: onda se ljudski pristup sigurnosti ne odnosi stricto sensus samo na unutrašnju sigurnost, nego prihvata europsku politiku susjedstva. Tu vidimo kako EU tumači svoju stratešku kulturu, prioritizirajući prijete kao što su terorizam i migracije. FRONTEX, EUROPOL, tehnološki orjentisana sredstva su onda direktna manifestacija novog okvira, koji usmjerava sigurnosni plan prema "mekom" modelu baziranom na saradnji. Ova studija ima za cilj dati kratki pregled te vizije, počev od izrade i njegove institucionalne historije, pa do konkretnih operativnih sredstava, unutar ili izvan okvira schengenskog prostora.

Ključne riječi: *Europska sigurnosna strategija, unutašnja sigurnost, vanjska sigurnost, terorizam, proces radikalizacije, europske policijske djelatnosti.*

Abstract:

The european security strategy is a built-in that imbricates itself in the existing structures, if schengen was the primary measure unit if extends beyond: the human security-based approach isn't then only related to internal security stricto sensus but embraces the European neighborhood

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policy as well. There we see how the EU interprets its strategic culture, prioritizing emergent threats such as terrorism or migration. FRONTEX, EUROPOL, the technology-related means are then direct manifestations of a new framework, orienting the security agenda towards a cooperation-based “soft” model. The present study aims to give a brief preview of that vision, from the elaboration and its institutional history, to its concrete operational means, within or outside the schengen space framework.

Keywords: *EU security strategy, Internal security, External security, Terrorism, Radicalization process, European policing.*

We can't apprehend a security policy at the EU level with a state-centered method. The issues are singular, different actors with different interests intervene in the policy making process, building a singular object. With the events of Paris and Brussels, does the EU's doctrine meet its challenges?

Given the Union's nature and history we can analyze EU's action under the scope of the human security concept. It can be considered as a paradigm that distinguishes itself from «traditionnal» national security doctrines, result of a long maturation that began with the appearance of new republics in eastern Europe after the collapse of the USSR. With a shift from pure military, conflict-based situations and issues, from states, the doctrine puts individuals at its center, prioritizing their safety, the respect of human rights, more largely the humans needs. The framework is both conceptual and cognitive, influencing not only how the EU conceives its foreign action but also how it apprehends its security on its own soil.

Methodology

The study aims more to build a picture of the EU's concrete security apparatus than to rationally a policy and how it's made. In other words how are the threats are perceived and how they're answered. The descriptive method used here will provide a succinct report of the EU's actual security framework by briefly describing the devices put in place, their capabilities, and how the various levels of policy and governance interact with each other. Through this method the aim is to build a base to interpret the concept of security in Europe, more particularly the present work strive to highlight the key points of the european strategy and how that definition relates to more conventional concepts and practices, such as state-centered elements, by comparing the relevant points under the scope of contemporary security challenges.

1. FINDING AND DISCUSSIONS

The range and the scope of internal security discussion on european level are continuously expanding, taking over various fields and domains: migration, crime, cooperation, policing. Looking at the “security continuum ideology”, following to which all the security threats are related to each other, inducing a security deficit belief that would trigger a response on the bureaucratic level, motivated by a corporatist scope. More broadly the Nation-state would be losing its importance in the profit of informal intergovernemental groups and actors.

Are we assisting to the developpment of a supranational, “stateless” police force? More generally how does the european internal security strategy relates to the various levels of governance?

The idea of a «local» strategy direction developped itself following the building of a common foreign and defense policy. Given the nature of the threats faced by the european continent the key terms are preemptive action and anticipation.

The launch of the Internal security strategy (ISS), was already foreseen into the then-EU constitution, lately replaced by the Lisbon treaty. It came in effect with the Stockholm Programm no earlier than 2010. Back then the strategy was «embryonic » but was already conceived as a «wide and comprehensive» process that involves multiples sectors and actors:« law-enforcement and border-management authorities, with the support of judicial cooperation, civil protection agencies and also of the political, economic, financial, educationnam, social and private sectors, including civil society and non-governmental organisations» (European council, 2010).

Security cooperation is conceived from the beginning as both horizontal (linking all the national and European main agencies to a common purpose), and vertical (gathering all active elements at national, regional, local level in a common framework). The ISS obeys to 3 principles:

- principle of availability: information and intelligence held by one has to be available for everyone
- principle of operability: the necessity to establish automatic access to EU and national database
- principle of convergence: the actors involved must mutualize training, softwares and tools to save money and capacities.

1.1. What definition of threat?

The concept of threat is central in the definition of the ISS. The EU remains «conventionnal» in how it conceives the concept of security. Due to its nature its logic there's an intrinsic link between «internal» and «external» threats, leading to an «ennemy within» object. We're understanding the concept of threat as the presence of identified coercitive forces which could be the source of impeding danger. The identification of threats is then determined by the culture of each new generation of european elites. By looking on the post-Maastricht period we can see that security was envisioned under the broad spectrum of criminal activity. The following years of the 9/11 have been marked by an emphasis on terrorism and counter-terrorism. Since 2010 and the Stockholm programme the scope is continuously widened, the focus is put on a broader definition of security in the regard of multiple threats and risks. Preemptive and anticipatory actions mentioned in the programme of Stockholm in 2010 are then mere objectifications of the process:

- The first implies existence of mechanisms meant to adress risks and threats that are statiscally knowable, perceivable by a cycle of regularity: Health, criminal activity monitoring and repression fall in that category.
- The anticipation however is a new theme that appeared for the first time in 2010. It's supposed to adress threats and risks that irregular, unpredictable. The spectrum of activities called terrorism due to its changing nature is particularly targetted. Strategically it implies to create counter measures by establishing built-in scenarios before the threat reveals itself. “Precautionary counter-terrorism”, anti-radicalization activities, frontline monitoring are part of the process.

Security in Europe wasn't envisioned as a proper project, an entire field of work. Initially it was part of the «Home Affairs» (internal security, immigration, policing, criminal law), a competency of the Commission and of the Council. The ISS, then called a «comprehensive strategy», was just scattered initiatives without a real political or institutionnal strategy.

In 2010 the EU implemented a «multi annual policy cycle» model for the period of 2010-2014, it set a structure for organizing security under the general objective of «tackling the organized crime in Europe»:

The policy cycle embodied a work direction where the EU institutions are central in the policy making process, overcoming day-to-day initiatives (political agenda of the competent actors) or pure assumptions (national police leaders belief). It aims to a more rationnal, coherent method of policy making by establishing stages, from assessment to evaluation. In 2014, the COSI finds its place as an intermediary body coordinating the activities of

others european agencies.

Looking onto the scope of application we can see that the EU never provided an official definition of organized crime. The EUROPOL's definition, very broad, embraces any type of criminal offence, from Cosa Nostra-like association, to «lone wolf» type terrorism. However the European Council does have the right to establish certain criterias, activities such as money laundering, computer crime, sexual exploitation, which were gradually included, adaptating the EU's policy to new issues and conditions, adressing both nature and means of the criminal spectrum.

Note that the EU does not have any coercitive powers, at least not on the european soil. European agencies do not provide security themselves, they participate in strenghtening, enhancing the capabilities already in place by acting as a coordinator, a set of institutions and agencies dedicated to facilitate information sharing and interoperability, a direction clearly visible in the capacities and orientations in place.

2. SECURITY OVERVIEW

In 2010 the programm of Stockholm established the priorities of the EU in the domain of justice, freedom and security. On security matters the strategy strives to achieve a common culture on European inner security. In the same year the European Commission came to the conclusion that the EU institutions should go «towards an european security model» and defined 5 strategic points for the 2010 to 2014 period:

- Disorganization of international criminal networks, especially regarding transborder and transnational activities.
- Terrorism prevention and struggle against radicalization, recruitment and financing. An emphasis is put on foreign fighters, «returnees» and solo actors which are targeted jointly with interpol and third countries.
- Raise of the cyber security level for the european citizen and private companies.
- Enhancement of the borders security operationnal measures.
- Enhancement of european resilience capabilities in case of crisis and disasters.

The Standing Committee on operational cooperation on internal security (COSI), created in february 2010 by a european council decision, is a direct manifestation of the EU changing work structures. The committe is composed of national representants and aims to facilitate, promote, coordinate operationnal cooperation between the member states in the domain of internal security. In reality the COSI has a strategic role. As the Internal Security Strategy for the European Union was elaborated, the COSI

was rapidly foreseen to play a key role in the process.

Between 2010 and 2014 new orientations emerged concerning a more comprehensive and coherent approach, both horizontal (regarding repression, borders security, judiciary, customs regulation, civilian protection, administrative authorities, cooperation with educationnal, non governmental organisations and private sector) and vertical (international cooperation with or within the EU, regional policies, member states cooperation, at the national, regional or local level).

The COSI insists on:

- National security is member states' responsibility.
- Necessity on the european level to focus on added value elements to the efforts of the member states.
- Necessity of elaborating flexible and operationnal approaches.

In addition, the European Commission, Council of Europe and European Parliament came with a planning for the Security orientations for 2015-2020 comprised in 5 points (European Commission, 2014):

- Fighting terrorism on all the sides: radicalization, recruitment, financing, both in Europe and aboard
- Prevention and struggle against the organized crime, both among the schengen and in the european neighborhood
- Prevention and struggle against the cybercrime, as well as the improvement of cybersecurity means.
- Improving the protection and security of strategic infrastructures (power plant, nuclear and chemical facilities to counter NBC risks), with a focus on resilience, operationnal preparation, and political coordination to adress the eventuality of a large scale disasters
- Modernization and enhancement of the integrated borders managment system (cooperation between police forces and other competents organizations) to cover all the aspects of the exterior borders security.

3. INTERNAL SECURITY

During the 2010-2014 the COSI highlighted various reform sectors and participated to the definition of a new operational framework. It especially recommended to fully exploit the Schengen framework to reinforce the exterior border control. The entire approach is based on technology and information, intended to build capabilities and procedures towards prevention at a strategic level, mobilizing all relevant organisations.

Europol is a community European agency that has for mission to facilitate intelligence information exchange between the various national police services but also to coordinate and centralize investigation against European or international criminal activities. The struggle against criminality is not an element among others in a wider security strategy, but the base layer on which the most of the European security capabilities were built.

In 2014 the EU made the first steps to make EUROPOL a central center on information and analysis on high-end crime :

- The first step being merging EUROPOL and CEPOL (European Police College) together.
- The second was the expansion of its power, particularly on accessibility of national database.

Although being a full agency since 2010 Europol remains without any coercive power, depending on the enforcement capabilities of the member states.

The Prüm convention, («Schengen plus» agreement) dedicated to strengthening cross-border cooperation, particularly in the struggle against terrorism, transnational crime and illegal migration, is the primary mechanism governing European cooperation. It established procedures, enhance and accelerate «hard information» exchange, particularly between member states on subject such as DNA and fingerprints data (with a hit/no hit mechanism). However not all the member states have implemented the device.

Following the 2015 terrorist incidents, the first January 2016 was created a Counter terrorism and financial intelligence center within the Europol agency (ECTC): an enhanced informational hub aiming to become a central structure. Until then Europol has benefited of a certain trust from the member state. Such an initiative is destined to strengthen the relationship on the terrorist issues. The ECTC will in fact serve as a center of expertise, providing intelligence sharing and analysis and contributing to coordinated reaction in case of an eventual terrorist event. The center also has competencies in terrorism financing, information technologies and telecommunication, illegal arms trafficking, and more widely any field that

could be related to terrorist action.

Since the first January 2016, Europol's financial intelligence and counter terrorism units have managed to integrate themselves in a decentralised network comprising member states' Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs). The platform was created in 2002 and initially supported EU Member States' authorities in their fight against money laundering and terrorist financing by allowing information and intelligence exchange between national financial units. Under the supervision of Europol the FIU platform aims to create more synergy between financial and criminal intelligence, simultaneously fighting criminal activities and terrorism. These two being closely related, the second possibly financing the first.

These various activities will be sustained by the two informations networks already in place:

- The Europol information system (EIS) a reference platform dedicated to informations exchange between police authorities
- The Secure information networking application (SIENA), focusing on interoperability and intelligence .

The whole added value of agencies such as Europol is based on the principle of solidarity : Informations sharing being done in both directions, based on good will and self-enhancing cooperation. However Europol stays tributary of its national partners: 50% of the total amount of informations is coming from no more than 5 states.

The EU agencies do not entirely rely on member states, the EU information system has some tools of its own, forming a system in its first sense by mobilizing information technologies.

The «smart borders system», an automated system registering the persons' circulation on the european territory, is one of these main tools. It has been in debate since 2008. In 2013, the Commission adopted a «smart borders package» comprising:

- the Entry/Exit System (EES) which will record the time and place of entry and exit of third country nationals travelling to the EU. Compelled with the VISA database it would proceed to an electronic calculating the length of the authorised short stay, issuing an alert to national authorities if there is no exit record by the right time.
- A VISA system: initially supposed to help implement the common visa policy, the VIS system is actually a network connecting all border crossing points, allowing guards to performing more efficient check and control by crossing informations. It's expected to become the largest biometric database in the world to which law enforcement authorities and EUROPOL have access, and soon to be expanded in the reste of the world.

This system is part of a wider set of devices, among which:

- The Schengen information system (SIS II, second generation deployed in 2013): an infrastructure supporting border control and related security tasks of police forces. Participating states provide informations, alerts, on persons, properties, which are accessible to any network member. Since 2013 it also features biometric info and is managed by EU-LISA. A total of 66 400 alerts for discreet and specific checks was counted on end of 2015 (European Commission, 2015).

Any person from a third country is subject to a SIS check upon his entry in the Schengen borders. Controls on EU nationals is not mandatory but can be carried if the Commission judges that there's a risk. It then proposed the establishment of «common risk indicators», giving criterias on who is a possible threat.

The SIS was the first device in place, initially destined to compensate the free circulation, draw the limits of the schengen space, it gradually became a database oriented towards surveillance and investigation.

- The PNR system (passenger name record) adopted by act the 15th july 2015 but in discussion at the European Justice Court, is a mechanism permetting passport tracability, allowing to record travelling data of all air companies passenger, entering or leaving Europe, in the perspective of establishing a world data bank accessible to european and partners agencies, such as foreign intelligence. The EU has concluded a PNR agreement with the United States, Canada and Australia and might be extended to other third countries.

The electronic «smart device» is not the only measure the EU has undertaken to control its borders, there's also the Hotspots, these «sorting centers» located outside borders and managed by FRONTEX are collecting data such as biometric (digital prints) from all persons trying to enter in EU out of conventionnal means (passport and ID cards). Whereas The EU-LISA is agency charged to managed the SIS and VIS, the operationnal work (informations exchange and discussions) is done within EUROPOL. Initially the european parlement wanted a one and unique european security database, but because of the successive waves of evolution the EU proceeded to a fragmentation of these ressources. Now the Commission tries to merge them by emphasizing interoperability via EUROPOL.

These devices and structures respond indeed to the principle of availability: Every national law enforcement authority, relevant EU agency or national organisation must benefit from an easy access to the needed data.

A directive that has been extended to EUROPOL. The agency being competent to sign cooperative agreements with third countries or foreign agencies, it led de facto to an extended access to the various EU databases. Especially as Europol has a broader access to the SIS and VIS system. Which completes the data transfer already engaged with sharing of the PNR system (Preuss-Laussinotte Sylvia, 2006:64). Regarding that «all-tech surveillance» approach, the growing interconnexion between all the databases and the merging services might be a risk in itself.

These initiatives aim to manage the flow of persons over the schengen space in a centralized manner, by a risk-based logic. We're assisting to a shift from national based control to an European monitoring system. In other words, we're going from a country centric, towards a person centric approach. Informations gathered, crossed between european and interpol database should provide elements for a risk analysis targetting not only suspicious individual from third states, but every person passing through EU territory, including european citizens themselves. Still, in the regard of the 2015 Paris events we can doubt of the relevance of such devices, meant to mostly monitor potential threats from outer EU, especially migrants. Potential terrorist agents aren't only travelling in foreign countries, they're possibly european nationals, proceeding to «evasive techniques» (when they're EU citizens), within the EU schengen space to avoid surveillance, or to eventually carry out attacks or prepare them.

In 2010 The COSI enjoined the EU institutions to create an european intelligence center. Today we can hardly talk about an EU efficient intelligence structure, but it is clear that the european security model leans towards a trans-governmental collaborative system. Where governemental sub-units are involved in direct and autonomous interaction, separate from states upper authorities (Nye Joseph, Kehoane Daniel 1972).

The IntCen (EU Intelligence and Situation Center), former SitCen (Situation Center) is the direct translation of that direction. Since 2002 it provides assessment, expertise to the EEAS and others concerned institutions.

The agency, exclusively civilian, is not an intelligence service as we can find among states : it proceeds to no investigation, has no operationnal power, no spying capabilities. It mainly holds an analysis function, an expertise and linguistic role. Its work is mainly based on «open source» documents, but does not exclude classified informations given by state agencies. Though national services do not provide operationnal intel, the IntCen mostly do risk and threat assessment, which are open ressources destined to many various actors, public (governements) or private (press, social networks). Its analysis then may have a significant impact on policy making process.

There's no plan for an european « spy center » of whatsoever even after the Paris 2015 events. Even if it was, few national actors, due to the concurrence in the intelligence sector, would carry such a view. Intelligence cooperation are mostly carried outside the IntCen, in bilateral relationship. The member states actively trying to keep their sub-official prerogatives. European security structures were always developed in a justice based approach, the decision to lead security sectors towards a more intergovernmental integrated dynamic is a recent project, and then meets obstacles due to its very nature.

Terrorism nature also has changed, we're not in the Al-Quaida-like, international model anymore, where individuals from abroad carry attacks on foreign soil. Such a model had a clear hierarchy, a clandestinity-based system where few individuals could enter, and more importantly, operated outer borders. Today, looking at the Islamic State transnational «popular» model, embracing any candidate to the Jihad, we can reasonably have doubts about the european security strategy. Its not-so-comprehensive approach is turned towards the borders and somehow seems to neglect the «rotten heart» of Europe, which belasts to national authorities in first instance, and lacks a truly european dimension. Concerning the future of the information agencies, we can hardly assume any view, for now they extensively proceed to data collecting, making «haystack», instead of more focus on individuals. Is «quantity over quality» a viable method?

4. ON CRISIS RESPONSE MEASURES AND MECHANISMS

Regarding the recent terrorist events we can question ourselves about the existence of european crisis response policies and measures to adress crisis break and developpement. Following the terrorist bombing of 2004 and 2005, in Madrid and London the EU put in place a Crisis Coordination Arrangments (CCA), meant to adress both man-made and natural disasters on european soil and in third countries by providing a framework for a strategic rapid and effective response. The system was reformed in 2013, replaced with the Integrated political crisis response (IPCR) due to its over-complicated nature.

The reform was part of a broader set of innovation among which The act for the fund for internal security (adopted in 2014): jointly to the Asylum and migration fund it comprises a common regulatory framework sustained by a budget of 3,764 billions of euros. It furnishes operational security mechanisms, means for emergency actions, and amplified cooperations tools (particularly with FRONTEX). Thus to the end of providing a support for a wider scope on european security strategy, which isn't limited to outer border managment but involves various law enforcement authorities (customs,

police, immigration).

The IPCR mechanisms allows the european council to carry out coordination, strenghtening the political process. It should enhance the joint approach, facilitate operationnal measures, mobilisation of relevant services and agencies. More importantly it could be used by invoking the clause of solidarity among member states in the case of a major crisis.

Based on the principle of subsidiarity, it does not replace existing measures at the state level. The mechanism was triggered in 2015 for the first time in response to the refugee crisis. Its function was mainly to gather concerned actor into strategic meetings in addition to share information in real time via a web platform.

This mechanism is effective concomitantly to a decision meant to specify the application conditions of the solidarity clause (art 222 of the TFEU): enabling EU institutions and member states in acting jointly to assist another european country subject to a terrorist attack, victim of a natural, or man-made, disaster. The clause applies to sea, air, land territories, especially regarding industrial facilities since they're under european jurisdiction.

The refugee crisis was litteraly a test round for the device, particulary a chance to monitor persons flows. Though it was never fully activated due to the will of the member states because of the possible restrictivness a common decision could implies on their sovereignty. The member states instead chosed to activate national borders control. The IPCR, initially destined to lighten the process poses in fact institutionnal and operationnal challenges, adding another layer of tools maybe actually creating more confusion than cooperation. Besides it's only activated on a crisis taking place on european soil. The events in Syria, for instance, didn't even lead to the activation of the first degree, the informational platform, probably due to its unfolding, taking place outside, far from EU. Such a behavior, in addition instutionnal inertia, shows a cultural and strategical identity. Europe is sure about one thing : foreign crisis aren't european security concerns, but the line between the ISS and the outer european territories is still blurred.

5. ON EXTERNAL SECURITY MECHANISMS

By european internal security we understand the security and safety among the member states and within the schengen states. However there's is no clear borders or distinctive limits between internal and what we shall call external security. By that we do not mean the foreign policy of the EEAS, or the CSDP but the initiatives taken by the Commission and the Council that take place outside schengen, concomitantly to the ISS. The inner space being strongly linked to its outer borders. It is necessary to understand how the EU conceives its immediate neighborhood.

The neighborhood policy is the framework used by the EU to achieve greater political association with its southern and eastern neighborhood, which are not foreseen for integration. The ENP is a key part of the EU foreign policy.

One of its key objective is to create a «security community» in which the EU would maintain close, cooperative relations with its partners. The feared threats are the same: terrorism, illegal migration. The proposed definition of security is euro-centric, we can talk about a «schengen security culture». Since 2002 the EU established priorities, among which the home affairs orientations, comprising security matters, tailored for each targeted country. The EU starts from the assumption that its neighborhood shares its interests and then motives a « collective approach ».

The «schengen culture», appeared in the early 1980, gradually institutionnalizing and propagating itself into the neighborhood. In the 1999, with the Amsterdam treaty application, Schengen, as the sum of norms regulating the european space has become the official framework defining the home affairs in Europe, and then security matters. That schengen culture was highlighted two times:

- during the 90's decay: with the downfall of the USSR, a wave of enlargement was triggered towards eastern europe and with it various political challenges. The overture of the East implied a space to invest and incorporate in the current model.
- in the 9/11 aftermath, where security culture was deeply redefined, confirming previous subnational threats. The events of 2015 enhancing therefore the tendancy.

In fact the external security preceeded the internal security. Security and safety being a condition to achieve a greater political and economical integration. Since 1995 the EU requires from its neighbors to reinforce controls in the aim of preventing threats before these appear in the heart of the continent. In other words their role is to stop «undesirable guests» before they get to the schengen borders, constituting buffer zones outside the schengen territory. The potential threats then being from third countries, or the neighbors themselves. Regarding the eventual need for security, the ENP could be undermining its own foundation principles, such as the principles of solidarity.

The EU objective is less to proceed to a greater political integration than to build a security complex at its borders. It's not an horizontal, partnership based system, but a concentric model where schengen space is the epicenter. An impression reinforced by the clear asymetrical nature of the relationship, there's a clear emphasis on security whereas «rewards», such as economic cooperation, or visa exception measures are not always delivered.

The EU in fact motivates its requests by the principle of reciprocity: the access to, for instance, the European market is subordinated to the objectives established in the partnership.

The *FRONTEX* agency then acts as the primary actor in the European borders management at the EU level. It conducts risk analysis, proceeds to training for national border guards, and carries out research. More particularly it plays an active cooperational role by coordinating joint borders management. Under its new mandate the agency has seen its capacities reinforced, plus new surveillance capabilities, through the creation of a Situational Centre. *EUROSUR* brings an interface between the agency and the concerned member states.

Frontex claims to strive for «well controlled and secured borders» through Integrated borders management. The agency is the closest actor to field operations, although not specifically targeting terrorism it addresses threats that are closely related to it, such as:

- Migration flow and passenger traffic management at the border perimeter, within not sovereign zones (international waters), or third countries.
- Continuity between internal and external security: by establishing a link between border management and criminal investigation, mobilizing databases such as the PNR or VIS.
- Representativity with third countries or actors: enhancing cooperation with third parties to lead to cooperation with the EU.

One of the primary functions of *FRONTEX* is to act as an agent of securization, a «watch dog», patrolling outside borders, intercepting individuals, with a focus on presumed migrants, in order to deter further attempts.

On the other hand *FRONTEX* is actually the first EU operational representative for third states. It acts as a sort middle man between the EU and the neighbors law enforcement agencies, actively participating to implement European policies on its level. Thus by training and familiarizing local forces to the EU's «*acquis communautaire*».

It's part of an ambivalent strategy: the ENP acts as a lever on the political level to permit to *FRONTEX* to implement its framework, third states sometimes being reluctant to adopt the European external view on borders issues.

The *European border system surveillance (EUROSUR)* is a framework designed to support the EU member states in their struggle against illegal immigration and outer threats. *EUROSUR* acts as a «system of systems», with multiple purposes, fostering inter-agency cooperation and interoperability, by first measuring situational awareness (capabilities to detect cross-border movements), and reaction capabilities (time to address

them and eventual unusual circumstances). On a second hand it provides a technical framework to rationalize cooperation, inter alia implementing an info sharing environment among national and european systems. The objective being producing data in real time.

It's implemented by a computerized network interface linked to surveillance tools such as sensors and satellites. In the end it could lead to prefigure a common intelligence draft, the objective being to build a broad network integrating all sectorial systems monitoring outer territories under the jurisdiction of member states, particularly seas. In the future it could be expanded beyond border related aspects, continuously adapting to new routes and methods in a joint response direction.

In parallel the Commission intends to promote *civilian initiatives outside the EU*, in fragile, possibly engaged in conflicts, third states. Thus by promoting and supporting local projects, providing an extra financing, cooperating to elaborate training programmes to share specific competencies and expertise with the frontline actors in the partner countries, especially those concerned by the neighborhood policy. More particularly it aims to incorporate security matters to educational programs funded by the EU, sustain the media as an intermediate players between the various type of actors in the targeted zones, incorporate strategies aiming to prevent radicalization. All that incorporated to the «classical» cooperation and development tools and policies, in particular among «failing states».

Such initiatives are most of the time literally delegated from the EU authorities to NGOs that answer to a call of proposal for action in a third country. These involve various themes but are always related to development, most of time with a human rights improvement scope.

6. FOCUS ON THE TERRORISM

More than 5000 people departed from the EU to conflict zones during 2015. Although a very small contingency is likely to conduct attack on european soil, authorities think that these persons, might have gained combat and operational experience and then by able to proceed to more impactful strikes. Even if they're not involved in attack preparation they may be active in:

- Radicalization process
- Facilitation and supportive activities
- Funding activities.

The struggle against violent extremism is mostly encompassed in the general framework by mobilizing resources at all levels and agencies while continuously building practices and programmes. The existing measures

primarily rely on law national enforcement agencies, strongly advised to use the existing resources as the shengen space (PNR system), while identifying eventual gaps in the struggle against violent extremism by capitalizing on existing cooperative structures (EUROPOL and information sharing platforms), which are security fields that have already been mutualized to address transnational terrorism-related activities such as arms traffic or money laundering. Thus while adopting an external strategy to combat external threats: cooperation through the Gulf Cooperation Council, the arab neighborhood countries and the UN relevant agencies, the EEAS and the European Commission are concerned by that direction. Such a strategy should be induced in the European Neighborhood Policy as well through the existing programmes and cooperations projects, in particular regarding civil societies and development, state building initiatives.

6.1. Counter-radicalization strategy

The EU's strategy is prevention before anything else, by adopting an inclusive dynamic towards civil society, NGOs and educational institutions to address radicalization. Notable progress was made in 2014: a new anti-radicalisation strategy was adopted (European Commission, 2014). Focusing on the sub national level, the member states are encouraged to put in place coherent, comprehensive frameworks, by extending practices beyond the law enforcement, mobilizing various actors, such as social workers, educators, in the aim of training experts who understand the process of radicalization. There the EU acts as a coordinator, the objective being to build an European knowledge hub, on the basis of the work of the RAN, to provide inputs at all the levels of the EU and coordinate activities inside and outside Schengen if needed.

The *RAN (Radicalization awareness network)*: launched in September 2011, is a network connecting practitioners from various fields to prevent and counter terrorism at the educational level. It involves religious leaders, policemen, researchers, teachers, social workers and provides the opportunity to interact with political leaders to build common indicators on the radicalization process. The RAN includes 8 working groups to identify new practices, share knowledge and experience, and finally provide feedback to participate in the policy elaboration process.

To this day the RAN has provided 3 key recommendations:

- developing multi actors frameworks enhancing cooperation at local level which would allow to build appropriate solutions and procedures to target individuals or groups more effectively.
- Helping individuals to leave extremists groups at national level by

establishing exit strategies.

- Involving former fighters, victims to share their story and experiences in the formulation of counter-extremist, strong narrative messages. Thus by mobilizing various resources and partners such as telecommunications, high audience medias, filmmaking, public relations.

The member states should participate in workshops on disengagement and deradicalization process of persons already in hate environments. In addition the European Commission directly supports national initiatives such as civil society or NGOs in the perspective of building a counterweight to radicalization mechanisms and actors.

6.2. Financing

A priority for the EU is the disruption of terrorist's sources of revenue. We can see there that the anti-terrorist strategy is close to the «classical» criminal repression approach. A certain number of amendment is scheduled for 2016 concerning the anti money laundering directive:

- Enhancing the powers of EU Financial Intelligence Units and facilitating their cooperation: the most notable reform is the integration of a financial and terrorist intelligence referral unit to EUROPOL, mobilizing the technological informations platform already in place.
- Centralized national bank and payment account registers or central data retrieval systems in all Member States: applying a logic similar to the identity tracking devices such as SIS or PNR.
- Tackling terrorist financing risks linked to virtual currencies: the only virtual currency being the bitcoin, it is not monitored in stock exchange or financial services. It can be bought with real currencies to anonymously buy goods, among which weapons and drugs on «deepweb» or «dark networks»
- Tackling risks linked to anonymous pre-paid instruments: the freedom involved in buying pre-paid card banks, although it's confined to micro-payments, it doesn't allow tracability of the funds.

The EU also puts to contribution its agencies to disrupt eventual terrorist incomes at their source :

- In third countries the EU Commission and EEAS will provide assistance to the middle east and northern african countries to overcome their deficiencies concerning money laundering or terrorist financing, while the member states should be monitoring the eventual penetration of financial flow. Financial intelligence units should be implemented too,

to assist member states via a platform meeting on a regular basis.

- The EU concluded with the USA an agreement permitting the access to financial data in the framework of the US TFTP (Terrorist finance tracking programme) agreement. By the principle of reciprocity, member states, EUROPOL and EUROJUST benefit from the data. Since 2010 7300 investigations were opened thanks to it.

However, european terrorist networks do have their own incomes, if not auto-financing, these funds are going aboard. Regarding the nature of the activity, it's the task of national authorities to tackle such manœuvres. We're considering fraud, sale of radical publications, membership fees and various «taxes», gathering and misuse of funds from so called charity events or donations or any other activity.

The thing is there is a «nexus» between terrorist activism and crime, wether it's organised or not.

Individuals involved in terrorist activities are often part of criminal networks, if not they mobilize them to obtain goods, services, finances, to fund their «main activity».

7. FOCUS ON THE WESTERN BALKANS

The countries of the Non-EU Balkans (Bosnia, Serbia, Albania, Kosovo, Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro), understanding the countries which are not (yet) members of the EU are not subject to the ENP but to a future integrative policy (Association and stabilisation process for some of them). The process itself is conceived as comprehensive, oriented towards development for an eventual integration.

Actually the western Balkans are schengen's « soft spot », litteraly forming a shadow on the security map of Europe. 3 threats are conceived:

- illegal migration, as a starting point towards Europe, but also as a path from outside Europe in regard of the actual migration crisis
- transnational and organized criminal activities such as trafficking (Kržalić A. Veladžić N., 2015) (weaponry, drugs, human beings) and smuggling (Hadžović D., Kržalić A., 2016).
- Terrorism, european authorities fear that the western Balkans could constitute a center for radicalization withtin Europe (Azinović V., Jusić M. 2016).

We're not talking here about solving western Balkans problems but adressing the European security issues in a zone that has been invested yet.

Strictly talking about the EU projects and initiatives, non considering the states eventual bilateral actions, the EU has a plan for the 2015 period based on on-going activities in the perspective to build a second plan for the years 2018-2020. EU is considering here a top-down approach with an integrative scope. The aim is to adapt the current security framework to the region, not to build a new one. For now we're talking about 3 main activities in the immediate time:

- expanding the RAN network in the balkans via regional or national platforms
- establish national capacities for Internet Referral Units by counter narratives prevention mechanisms
- expand the counter terrorist informations network via EUROPOL's SIENA.

The security issues do not lie on the european capabilities, but on the efficiency and effectiveness of the local authorities and law enforcement agencies. The main problem in the region is the «state weakness» that's touching most of its countries and could become a real security threat in the years to come.

Globally the EU security strategy aims to create an european security space, inside and outside its borders to prevent the eventual terrorist occurrence. The concept of security has to be approached in its european dimension, meaning a cooperative law enforcement direction sustained by a technology-based informational system, not a state-centered self dedicated approach. The 2017-2020 agenda plans the following activities:

- Centralize the terrorism repression capacities towards the european center against terrorism integrated to Europol.
- Build a forum to discuss new technologic matters, in particular cryptography.
- Adress the radicalization phenomenon in prison.
- Expand the work of the RAN into the western balkans, middle east, nort africa.

CONCLUSION

The european security strategy, until then envisioned essentially under the scope of the human security, shifted to a more “conventionnal”, state-like home affairs model, particularly in the identification of threats and how to adress them.

Europe is entering a territorial logic, building sanctuaries and buffer zones, in facts clearly materializing effective european borders with schengen as a framework, which until then was left undefined, both on its enlargement perspective or on the free circulation.

Internal security concept in its primary definition cover practices within a territory in the aim of ensuring a safe and secure environnement. Looking at the european strategy we can observe that the mechanisms are meant to provide border regulation. Surveillance devices are a direct manifestation of that change in work structures., thus by identifying individuals wether they travel (from) abroad, or within Europe, building huge databases in a prevention logic.

In the end internal security remains internal, the member-states ensure their safety and security by themselves, keeping their prerogatives, the EU is then merely acting as a facilitator. The policing mechanisms reveals of that tendency : the Union doesn't have a proper security apparatus of its own, all the capacities, in addition of being highly dependant on member states, are extensions of national political agendas. In facts the aim is more about establishing an european provision than autonomous capabilities, coordinating, centralizing, advising, but at no moment proceeding to autonomous work.

The security process in itself is highly determined by national practices, the emphasis that has been put on terrorist threats is a direct result of a more national security oriented culture, identifying threats following a distinctive borders logic, within or outside a given territory. Regarding the very nature of the schengen space, we can ask ourselves if such a vision is compatible with the european territory.

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